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FOREWORD
The Debris Team has developed and implemented measures to control damage from debris in the
Shuttle operational environmem and to make the control measures a part of routine launch flows,
These measures include engineering surveillance during vehicle processing and closeout
operations, facility and flight hardware inspections before _d after launch, and photographic
analysis of mission evems
Photographic analyses of mission imagery from launch, on-orbit, and landing provide significant
data in verifying proper operation of systems and evaluating anomNies. In addition to the
Kennedy Space Center Photo/Video Analysis, reports from .Johnson Space Center and MarshN1
Space Flight Center are also included in this document to provide an integrated assessment of the
• °
mission.
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Photo 1" Launch of Shuttle Mission STS-87
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1.0 SUMMARY
STS-87, which included the flight elements of OV-102 Columbia (24th flight), ET-89 (LWT 82),
and BI-092 SRB' s, launched from Pad 39B/MLP- 1 on 19 November 1997 at 2:46 p.m. eastern
time. Several anomalies and debris issues were documented on this mission.
Post launch inspection of Pad 39B revealed both left and fight SRB aft skirt GN2 purge lines
were missing approximately 12 inches of tube and flex-line. Typically, the purge lines are bent or
deformed by SRB exhaust plume impingement. This was the first occurrence of missing hardware
and was considered to be an "out-of-family" condition. The remaining, or lower, part of the line
was still attached to the MLP GN2 standpipe supporting structure adjacent to holddown posts #2
and #6. The fight flex-line was recovered in an area just north of the SRB flame trench. This flex-
line measured 10.5-inches long by 2.25-inches maximum width. The left flex-line was
subsequently discovered on or near a holddown post haunch during MLP refurbishment
operations. All four rigid components of the GN2 purge lines were recovered, though
approximately 90 percent of the stainless steel braided portion of the flex-line was not recovered.
Review of the MLP high speed camera films after launch showed both purge lines extracted
smoothly from the SRB aft skirts at liftoff. The lines appeared undamaged and in the upright
position for 2.1 seconds, at which time the SRB exhaust plume smoke obscured the view.
Analysis of the recovered components revealed a failure due to the effects of heat damage
(melting) from SRB exhaust plume impingement and led the investigation team to conclude the
design capability did not withstand the thermal environment. As a result, the GN2 purge line will
be redesigned.
During ascent, film and video provided views of a Dome Mounted Heat Shield (DMHS) closeout
blanket at the 500 o'clock position of SSME #1 starting to tear and unstitch at T+20.5 seconds
MET. Air flow and plume recirculation eventually caused the blanket to come loose at T+38.5
seconds MET. The blanket appeared to be lifted in the +Z direction and passed between the
S SME #1 nozzle and the drag chute door before falling aft. The streaks all of the Orbiter in this
same time frame are attributed to the blanket passing through the S SME exhaust plumes.
In orbit, still images of the ET after separation from the Orbiter were obtained by the crew. The
ET was approximately 1.1 kilometers away when the first still frame was taken. These images
showed that substantial amounts of TPS were missing from both ET thrust panels forward and aft
of the ET/SRB attach fittings.
The still images and almost two minutes of video footage taken with a camcorder also provided
rarely seen views of gaseous hydrogen venting from the 7-inch QD in the intertank. Venting from
this location had been observed only once before on STS-45. Since the venting was not visible in
the 16ram ET/ORB umbilical films (distance of 200+ feet and time of 49 seconds after
separation), this event and any associated debris were judged to have no affect on the Orbiter or
be associated with any tile damage. The venting itself is not considered anomalous.
During left SRB aft skirt disassembly at Hangar AF, an Insta-Foam spray nozzle was found
embedded in the all ring foam mid way between the actuators. Technicians recalled the missing
nozzle occurrence while performing the spraying operation, but did not find the nozzle aider an
extensive search. This problem has since been corrected by changing the foam application
procedures and devising a nozzle tie-wrap retention system.
A post landinginspectionshowedtheOrbiter tilessustainedatotal of 308hits, of which 132had
a major dimensionof 1-inchor larger.This total doesnot includethe numeroushits on the base
heatshieldattributedto SSMEvibration/acousticsandexhaustplumerecirculation.A comparison
of thesenumbersto statisticsfrom 72 previousmissionsof similar configuration(.excluding
missionsSTS-23,24, 25, 26, 26R,27R, 30R, and 42, which had damagefrom known debris
sources),indicatesboth thetotal numberof hitsandthenumberof hits 1-inchor largerwas "out
of family".
The Orbiter lower surfacesustainedat least244 significanthits, of which 109 had a major
dimensionof 1-inchor larger.Virtually all of this unusualdamagewasconcentratedin the area
betweenthe noselanding gear andthe main landinggear more or lesssymmetricallydivided
betweenleft andfight outboardsides.Thelargestlower surfacetile damagesitewas locatedon
the left glove. The site measured15-incheslong by 2-incheswide by 0.25-inchesdeep. The
deepestlower surfacetile damagesitewaslocatedjust forward of the left mainlandinggearwell.
It measured4-incheslong by 2-incheswide by 1.5-inchesdeep.Tile materialin the damagesites
showedsignsof glazing andheateffectsfrom re-entry.The damagesiteswith significantdepth
appearedto begenerallyalignedin afore to aft direction. Many of thesesiteswere affectedby
re-entryaerodynamicerosion.
Unusualtile damageoccurredon the lower outboardleadingedgesof both OMS pods.There
were33 total hits, of which 14werelargerthan1-inchin size.
In orderto determinethe causeof thisdamage,theon-orbit films(ET/ORBumbilicalcamerasand
crew hand-heldstill photographs)were reviewed,and as statedpreviously,revealedsignificant
lossof TPSfrom bothET thrustpanels- anNSTS-7700violation andIn-FlightAnomaly.
Sincethe samedamagepatternoccurredon STS-86,atrendwasestablishedthat mayinvolvethe
changeto NCFI 24-124usedon thethrust panels.An investigationteamis alsoexanumngTPS
densityand strength,structuralloadsandflexing of the thrust panels,aerodynamicloading,and
theflight environment.
As a resultof this investigation,plugpull teststo verify materialstrengthwere performedon the
ET-90 (STS-89)thrust panels.All of thetest resultswerewithin specification.Nevertheless,the
panelswere then modified. Thefoam wasmachined/sandedto minimumdrawingrequirements
abovethe rib tops and the find was removedin the rib valleysto improvethe stress/strain
capability,eliminatea densermateriallayer, reducethe amountof potentialdebrismaterial,and
reducethe foamheightabovethe panelribs to decreasethe cross-flowair loadingon the foam.
All of thesemeasureswere designedto eliminateor reducethe amount of TPS loss from the
thrust panels,andin turn reducetheamountof damageto Orbitertiles.
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2.0 PRE-LAUNCH BRIEFING
The Debris/Ice/TPS and Photographic Analysis Team briefing for launch activities was conducted
on 18 November 1997 at 1400 hours. The following personnel participated in various team
activities, assisted in the collection and evaluation of data, and contributed to reports contained in
this document.
J. Tatum
G. Katnik
J. Lin
R. Speece
B. Bowen
J. Rivera
B. Davis
R. Page
J. Blue
R. Seale
W. Richards
M. Wollam
G. Fales
T. Ford
F. Foster
C. Hill
B. St. Aubin
S. Otto
J. Ramirez
J. Burney
NASA- KSC CNef, ET/SRB Mechanical Systems
NASA- KSC Shuttle Ice/Debris Systems
NASA- KSC Shuttle Ice/Debris Systems
NASA- KSC Thermal Protection Systems
NASA- KSC Infrared Scanning Systems
NASA- KSC ET Mechanisms/Structures
NASA- KSC DigitN Imaging Systems
NASA-KSC SSP Imegration
USA- SPC ET Mechanical Systems
USA- SPC ET Mechanical Systems
USA- SPC ET Mech_cal Systems
USA- SPC ET Mechanical Systems
USA- SPC ET Mechanical Systems
USA- SPC Mech_cal Systems
BNA- LSS Systems Integration
BNA- LSS Systems Integration
THIO - LSS SRM Processing
LMSO - LSS ET Processing
LMSO LSS ET Processing
USA Safety
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3.0 LAUNCH
STS-87 was launched at 97:32319:4559.993 UTC (2:46 p.m. local) on 19 November 1997.
3.1 PRE-LAUNCH SSV/PAD DEBRIS INSPECTION
A pre-launch debris inspection of the launch pad and Shuttle vehicle was performed on
18 November 1997. The detailed walkdown of Pad 39B and MLP-1 also included the primary
flight elements OV-102 Columbia (24th flight), ET-89 (LWT 82), and BI-092 SRB _s. There were
no significant vehicle or launch pad anomalies. There were no problems with Orbiter tiles or
External Tank TP S.
3.2 FINAL INSPECTION .......
The Final Inspection of the cryoloaded ve_cle was performed on 19 November 1997 from 0930
to 1055 hours during the two hour built-in-hold at T-3 hours in the countdown. There were no
Launch Commit Criteria (LCC), OMRS, or NSTS-08303 criteria violations. No Ice, Debris, or
TPS IPR's were taken. Due to the mid-af_ernoon launch time and warm ambient weather
conditions, there were no acreage icing concerns. There were also no protuberance icing
conditions outside of the established data base.
A portable Shuttle Thermal Imager (STI) infrared scanning radiometer was utilized to obtain
vehicle surface temperature measurements for an overall thermal assessment of the vehicle,
particularly those areas not visible from remote fixed scanners, and to scan for unusual
temperature gradients.
3.2.1 ORBITER
No Orbiter tile or RCC panel anomalies were observed. All RCS thruster covers were intact
though the cover on thruster F4R was tinted green indicating a slight internal vapor leak. T_ical
ice/frost and condensate had formed on SSME #1 and #2 heat shield-to-nozzle interfaces. The
SSME #3 heat shield was dry. An infrared scan revealed no unusual temperature gradients on the
base heat shield or engine mounted heat shields.
3.2.2 SOLID ROCKET BOOSTERS
SRB case temperatures measured by the STI radiometers were close to ambient temperatures. All
measured temperatures were above the 34 degrees F minimum requirement. The predicted
Propellant Mean Bulk Temperature supplied by THIO was 68 degrees F, which was within the
required range of 44-86 degrees F.
5 _ii!
_ ii_ i_i:_:¢ii?i_i _i!_
3.2.3 EXTERNAL TANK
The ice/frost prediction computer program 'SURFICE' was mn as a comparison to infrared
scanner point measurements. Given the warm, ambient conditions (58-67 degrees Fahrenheit,
78-87 percent relative humidity, winds 6-12 knots at 330 degrees), the program predicted
condensate with no ice or frost on the ET acreage TPS.
The Final Inspection Team observed very light condensate, but no ice or frost accumulations, on
the LO2 tank acreage. TPS surface temperatures ranged from 53 to 57 degrees F.
The intertank acreage exhibited no TPS anomalies. No cracks were visible in the intertank acreage
TPS or thrust panels. Foam surface temperatures averaged 65 degrees F. Ice/frost accumulation
on the GUCP was less than usual.
!_!_'i_ii i:_i!iii!ii_ !i iiil¸¸ !!_
The Final Inspection Team observed very light condensate, but no ice or frost accumulations, on
the LH2 tank acreage. TPS surface temperatures ranged from 51 to 58 degrees F. All TPS repairs
on the +Z side of the LH2 tank were intact with no visible frost lines.
Ice/frost accumulationsin the LO2 feedline
lessthanusual.
bellowsandsupportbracketswere characterizedas
The stressrelief crackin the -Y vertical strut forwardfacingTPSwasestimatedto be 10-inches
long by 3/8-incheswide. The presenceof this stressrelief crackwas expectedandacceptablefor
flight pertheNSTS-08303criteria.
Therewere no TPS anomalieson the LO2 ET/ORB umbilical. Ice/frost accumulationswere
limited to small patcheson the aft and inboard sides.Ice/frost fingers on the separationbolt
pyrotechniccanisterpurgeventsweresomewhatlongerin lengththanusual.Ice 5-incheslong by
3-incheswide by 1-inchthick hadformedon the aft pyro cancloseout.The presenceof this ice
wasacceptablefor launchper theNSTS-08303criteria.
Ice andfrost in the LH2 recirculationline bellowsandon bothburst diskswas typical.TheLH2
feedlinebellowsappearedto bedry.
Less than usualamountsof ice/frost had accumulatedon the LH2 ET/ORB umbilical purge
barrier outboardsideand forward surface.Ice/frost fingerson the pyro canisterand plate gap
purgeventsweresomewhatlongerin lengththanusual.No anomalousvaporsor cryogenicdrips
hadappearedduringtanking,stablereplenish,andlaunch.
3.2.4 FACILITY
All SRB sound suppression water troughs were filled and properly configured for launch. No
leaks were observed on the GUCP or the LO2 and LH2 Orbiter T-0 umbilicals.
3.3 T-3 HOURS TO LAUNCH
After completion of the Final Inspection on the pad, surveillance continued from the Launch
Control Center. Twenty-two remote controlled television cameras and two infrared radiometers
were utilized to perform scans of the vehicle. No ice or frost on the acreage TPS was detected.
Protuberance icing did not increase noticeably. With the rise in ambient temperature, no icing
concerns were predicted. At T-230, the C_X vent seals were deflated and the C_X vent hood
lifted. Although frost covered some of the ET nose cone louvers - an expected condition - no ice
was detected.
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Photo 2:STS-87 Ready for Launch
OV-102 Columbia (24th flight), ET-89 (LWT 82), and BI-092 SRB's
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Photo 3- LO2 Tank After Cryoload
The Final Inspection Team observed light condensate, but no ice or frost accumulations, on the
LO2 tank acreage. TPS surface temperatures ranged from 53 to 57 degrees F. No damage to
either -Y or +Y ET intertank thrust panel TPS was observed prior to launch.
8

Photo 4" Overall View of SS_IE's
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4.0 POST LAUNCH PAD DEBRIS INSPECTION
The post launch inspection of MLP 1, Pad B FSS,
19 November 1997 from Launch + 1 to 3 hours.
RSS, and pad apron was conducted on
No stud hang-ups occurred on this launch. Boeing - Downey had reported an Orbiter liftoff lateral
acceleration of 0.06 g's, which is below the threshold (0.14 g's) for stud hang-ups. SRB hold
down post erosion was less than usual. North holddown post blast covers and T-0 umbilicals
exhibited typical exhaust plume damage. White RTV was missing from the bases of holddown
posts #3, #7, and #8.
Both left and fight SRB aft skirt GN2 purge lines (P/N 10185-0018-101) were missing
approximately 12 inches of tube and flex-line. Typically, the purge lines are bent or deformed by
SRB exhaust plume impingement. This was the first occurrence of missing hardware and was
considered to be an "out-of-family" condition (PR PV6332972/D-BI-092L-0003). The remaining,
or lower, part of the line was still attached to the MLP GN2 standpipe supporting structure
adjacent to holddown posts #2 and #6. The fight flex-line was recovered in an area just north of
the SRB flame trench. This flex-line measured 10.5-inches long by 2.25-inches maximum width.
The left flex-line was subsequemly discovered on or near a holddown post haunch during MLP
refurbishment operations. All four rigid components of the GN2 purge lines were recovered,
though approximately 90 percent of the stainless steel braided portion of the flex-line was not
recovered.
Review of the MLP high speed camera films after launch showed both purge lines extracted
smoothly from the SRB aft skirts at liftoff. The lines appeared undamaged and in the uptight
position for 2.1 seconds, at which time the SRB exhaust plume smoke obscured the view.
Analysis of the recovered components revealed a failure due to the effects of heat damage
(melting) from SRB exhaust plume impingement and led the investigation team to conclude the
design capability did not withstand the thermal environment. As a result, the GN2 purge line will
be redesigned.
The Tail Service Masts (TSM's) appeared undamaged and the bonnets were closed properly.
Likewise, the Orbiter Access Arm (0AA) seemed to be undamaged.
The GH2 vent line was latched in the sixth of eight teeth of the latching mechanism. No damage
was apparent on the GUCP 7-inch QD surface from contact with the static retract lanyard. All
observations indicated a nominal retraction and latchback, though the GH2 vent line exhibited
heat effects/damage from the SRB exhaust plume.
The C_X vent seals were in excellent shape with no indications of plume damage. No topcoat
from the External Tank nose cone adhered to the seals. Several pieces of thin sheet metal from the
C_X vent arm heated purge ducts were found on the MLP deck and pad surface.
Debris findings were numerous. Nuts, bolts, washers, signs, placards, parts tags, brackets, pieces
of fiberglass, RTV, and concrete chips were scattered on the pad surface and in the SSME flame
trench. A 7-foot long by 1-foot wide cable tray cover lay in the acreage just east of the pad apron.
On the FSS, fire extinguishers lay on the floor of the elevator, the new plastic elevator push
buttons were melted, a 2-foot by 1-foot cable tray cover lay on the 13 5 foot level deck, and white
plastic pieces from lighting fixtures were found on many of the levels. A 2-inch spring was found
in the MLP west side gutter.
10
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Photo 5- SRB Aft Skirt GN2 Purge Lines
Both lef_ and fight SRB af_ skirt GN2 purge lines were missing approximately 12 inches of tube
and flex-line. Typically, the purge lines are bent or deformed by SRB exhaust plume impingement.
This was the first occurrence of" missing hardware and was considered to be an _%ut-of-family _'
condition. The remaining, or lower, part of the line was still attached to the MLP GN2 standpipe
supporting structure adjacent to holddown posts #2 and #6 (le_ photo). The right flex-line was
recovered in an area just north of the SRB flame trench. This flex-line measured 10.5-inches long
by 2.25-inches maximum width (fight photo). The lef_ flex-line was subsequently discovered on or
near a holddown post haunch during MLP refurbishment operations.
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5.0 FILM REVIEW ....
Anomalies observed in the Film Renew were presented to the Mission Management Team,
Shuttle managers, and ve_cle systems engineers. One IFA (STS-87-T-1) was generated as a
result of the film review.
5.1 LAUNCH FILM AND VIDEO SUMMARY
A total of 82 films and videos, which included twenty-eight 16mm films, eighteen 35mm films,
and thirty-six videos, were reviewed starting on launch day. Due to clouds and atmospheric haze,
vehicle detail was sometimes difficult to discern.
Free burning hydrogen drifted up to the OMS pods during start-up before being drawn into the
plume by aspiration (OTV-170, TV-7). Film items E-76 and E-63 showed SSME Mach diamonds
forming in a 2-3-1 sequence.
SSME ignition caused pieces of ice to fall from the ET/ORB umbilicals. Several pieces of ice
contacted the umbilical cavity sills and were deflected outward. No tile damage was visible. Small
pieces of ice falling from the LH2 feedline bellows contacted the LH2 recirculation line, but no
damage to TPS was visible (OTV-109).
One dark and two light pieces of debris appeared to originate from the fight SRB ETA platform
on the RSS at 19:45:56.490 UTC. The debris fell south of the MLP and was not near the vehicle
(E-63).
Tile surface coating material was lost during ignition from four places on the base heat shield
adjacent to and outboard of the SSME #2 engine mounted heat shield (E-18) and two places on
the body flap +Z side outboard of SSME #3 (E-76).
No ice or anomalies were detected on the External Tank nose cone (OTV 113, 160, 162).
Numerous small, black pieces of debris (possibly pieces of mud from a wasp nest), appeared to
originate from the aft edge of the GUCP just after GH2 vent line disconnect from the ET (E-33).
There was no apparent damage to ET TPS.
There were no stud hang-ups. No ordnance debris or frangible nut pieces fell from the DCS/stud
holes. The north holddown post blast covers closed normally.
The post launch pad inspection revealed the loss of both left and fight SRB aft skirt GN2 purge
lines. The left purge line was last visible at T+2.22 seconds MET before being obscured by smoke
and exhaust plume (E-8). The fight purge line appears to be discernible through smoke until
T+2.369 seconds MET (E-13). Note: at T+2.2 seconds, the aft ring of the SRB aft skirt appears
to have an altitude of 40-50 feet above the MLP deck. No debris objects that could be associated
with the missing purge lines were observed in any of the launch films.
Film item E-213 showed a piece of the ET/ORB umbilical purge barrier fall aft just after
completion of the roll maneuver, get caught in air flow recirculation, and travel forward where it
contacted and adhered to the base heat shield just outboard of SSME #2. This piece of material
fluttered in the air flow the entire time this part of the vehicle was visible. As a result of this odd
(and first time) occurrence, some minor tile damage may be expected.
A flash in the SSME exhaust plume occurred at T+I 7 seconds MET (E-52).
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Film item E-207 and video item ET-207 provided the best views of a Dome Mounted Heat Shield
(DMHS) closeout blanket at the 5:00 o'clock position of SSME #1 starting to tear and unstitch at
T + 20.5 seconds MET. Air flow and plume recirculation eventually caused the bla_et to come
loose at T + 38.5 seconds MET. The blanket appeared to be lifted in the +Z direction _d passed
between the S SME #1 nozzle and the drag chute door before falling aft. The streaks aft of the
Orbiter in this same time flame are attribmed to the bluet passing through the SSME exhaust
plumes. Other views of this event were obtained from film items E-213,-220, -222; TV-5, TV-21
Typical movement of the body flap in flight was visible in film items E-207 and E-213.
SRB separation appeared normal (E-212, TV-21).
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Photo 6" SSME Heat Shield Blanket
Film item E-207 and video item ET-207 provided the best views of a Dome Mounted Heat Shield
(DMttS) closeout blanket at the 500 o' clock position of SSME #I starting to tear and unstitch at
T + 20.5 seconds MET (leR photo). Air flow and plume recirculation eventually caused the
blanket to come loose at T + 38.5 seconds MET. The blanket appeared to be fired in the +Z
direction and passed between the SSME #1 nozzle and the drag chute door before falling aft
(fight photo).
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5.2 ON-ORBIT FILM AND VIDEO SUMMARY
OV-102 was equipped to carry umbilical cameras: 16ram motion picture with 5 mm lens; 16mm
motion picture with 10mm lens; 35mm still views. Hand-held photography, which consisted of
fifty-three 70mm still images and video footage, was taken by the flight crew. The +X translation
was performed on this mission.
LH2 ET/ORB 16mm films
SRB separation from the Extemal Tank appeared normal. The wide angle ET/ORB LH2 umbilical
camera provided a view of both SRB forward sldrts/frustums/nosecaps during separation. The
nosecaps, which are not recovered for post flight inspection at Hangar AF, appeared to be intact
and undamaged.
ET-89 separation from the Orbiter was normal. No venting from the GUCP/intertank area was
observed in these two films. No significant divots were detected in the LO2, LH2, and intertank
acreage. Small, bright spots on the upper LH2 tank near the bipods were associated with sanded
repairs, which were documented in the prelaunch closeout photography.
No anomalies were detected on the ET nose cone. A bright spot on the LO2 tank XT-439
pressurization line mount aft of the nose cone was attributed to a large sanded area documented in
prelaunch photographs.
Two divots were visible on adjacent intertank stringer heads between the +X aero vent and the
RSS antenna. Primed substrate was not visible, indicating shallow divots. Prelaunch photos
showed no repairs in this area.
No divots in the intertank splices or the jack pad standoff closeouts were detected in these films
though there were seven very small "popcorn" divots on stringer heads forward of the bipods. A
light area (lighter than the surrounding foam) could be seen in the shadowed area in the far -Y
side of the intertank near the ET/SRB attach fitting and may be indicative of a divot. No such area
was documented in prelaunch photos.
Foam on both thrust struts exhibited damage. Eight divots were detected on the -Y thrust strut
and flange closeout. Some of these divots were fore-to-aft gouges and gave the appearance of
being caused by debris impacts.
L02 ET/ORB 35mm film
The 35mm film from the LO2 ET/ORB umbilical camera consisted of 59 high resolution views of
the ET +Z side. The details previously discussed in the 16mm films were verified. The bipod jack
pad standoff closeouts were intact. However, numerous divots were visible in the +Y thrust panel
TPS forward and aft of the ET/SRB forward attach point (the -Y thrust panel was in shadow and
therefore not visible). One 8-inch diameter divot was detected in the LH2 tank-to-intertank flange
closeout between the +Y thrust panel and the LO2 feedline. The BSM burn scar on the LO2 tank
was typical.
Impact-type damage and fore-to-aft gouges were present in the TPS on the +Y thrust strut,
feedline flange closeouts, and the pressurization line ramps.
LO2
The LO2 ET/ORB umbilical appeared to be undamaged, though erosion and divots were visible in
the horizontal and vertical sections of the cable tray. "Popcorn" type divots were greater in
number on the aft dome and the lower LH2 tank acreage - an expected occurrence with the new
(NCFI) foam.
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Crew Hand-Held Images
• r
Fit'ty-three still images of the ET after separation from the Orbiter were obtained by the crew
using the 70mm Hasselblad camera. The ET was approximately 1.1 kilometers away when the
first still fr_e was taken. These images showed conclusive proof that substantial amounts of TPS
were missing from both ET thrust panels forward and all of the ET/SRB attach fittings. However,
the images could not substantiate the appearance/presence of substrate with primer in the divots.
The still images and almost two minutes of video footage taken with a camcorder also provided
rarely seen views of gaseous hydrogen vetoing from the 7-inch QD in the intert_. Vetoing _om
this location had been observed only once before on STS-45. Since the vetoing was not visible in
the 16mm ET/ORB umbilical films (distance of 200+ feet and time of 49 seconds _er
separation), this event and any associated debris were judged to have no affect on the Orbiter or
be associated with any tile damage. The venting itself is not considered anomalous.
'
5.3 LANDING FILM AND VIDEO SUMMARY
A total of 23 films and videos, which included nine 35mm large format films, two 16mm film, and
twelve videos, were reviewed.
The landing gear extended properly. The infrared scanners showed no debris falling from the
Orbiter during final approach. The left main landing gear contacted the runway just before the
fight tire (east of the runway centerline). Touchdown of the nose l_ding gear was smooth. The
Orbiter rolled east of the centerline before being steered back onto the centefline.
Drag chute operation appeared nominal. Rollout and wheel stop were uneventful.
TPS damage on the lower surface of both fight and left glove area was visible in the films.
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Photo 7- SRB Separation from External Tank
SRB separation from the External Tank appeared nominal. The wide angle ET/ORB LH2
umbilical camera provided a view of both SRB forward skirts/fmstums/nosecaps during
separation. The nosecaps, which are not recovered for post flight inspection at Hangar AF,
appeared to be intact and undamaged.
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Photo 8" ET Separation from Orbiter
ET-89 separation from the: Orbiter was normal. Foam on both thrust struts exhibited damage.
Eight divots were detected on the -Y thrust strut and flange closeout. Some of these divots were
fore-to-aPe gouges and gave the appearance of being caused by debris impacts.
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Photo 9" View from 35mm Umbilical Camera
Impact-type damage and fore-to-af_ gouges were present in the TPS on the +Y thrust strut (1),
LO2 feedline flange closeouts (2), and the pressurization line ramps (3). The LO2 ET/ORB
umbilical appeared to be undamaged, though erosion and divots were visible in the horizontal (4)
and vertical (5) sections of the cable tray. "Popcorn" type divots were greater in number on the
af_ dome and the lower LH2 tank acreage - an expected occurrence with the new (NCFI) foam.
19
!_!ii_I__ iii!,__,i_i_ii_•
_ _ _ii!i_
ii !_ii!_ i!iii_
_,_ _ _i_i_iiii_il!
_i!i___!_i....
ii_ _ _i_i_
i _i _i_il ¸I !ill....
_!_i__i_i_i_!_i_iiii_i''_
ili_!i_i ii_iii'_i!i_!i_i_iiii_ii!_i_i_ _,
_i,_! _,i_,
Photo 10: Thrust Panel Foam Damage
The bipod jack pad standoff closeouts were intact. However, numerous divots were visible in the
+Y thrust panel TPS forward and at_ of the ET/SRB forward attach point (the -Y thrust panel
was in shadow and therefore not visible). One 8-inch diameter divot was detected in the LH2
tank-to-intertank flange closeout between the +Y thrust panel and the LO2 feedline. The B SM
burn scar on the LO2 tank was typical.
2O

Photo 11- Crew Hand-Held Still Images
Still images of the ET a_er separation from the Orbiter were obtained by the crew using the
70ram camera. The ET was approximately 1.1 kilometers away when the first still flame was
taken. These images showed conclusive proof that substantial amounts of TPS were missing from
both ET thrust panels forward and aft of the ET/SRB attach fittings.
21

Photo 12" Gaseous Hydrogen Venting
A rarely seen view of gaseous hydrogen venting from the 7-inch QD in the intertank. Venting
from this location had been observed only once before on STS-45. Since the venting was not
visible in the 16ram ET/ORB umbilical films (distance of 200+ feet and time of 49 seconds after
separation), this event and any associated debris were judged to have no affect on the Orbiter or
be associated with any tile damage. The venting itself is not considered anomalous. Note damage
to TPS on nearby intertank thrust panel.
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6.0 SRB POST FLIGHT/RETRIEVAL DEBRIS ASSESSMENT
The BI-092 Solid Rocket Boosters were inspected for debris damage and debris sources at CCAS
Hangar AF on 24 November 1997.
Both frustums were in excellent condition. No TPS was missing and no debonds/unbonds were
detected over fasteners. Virtually none of the Hypalon paint had blistered. All eight BSM aero
heat shield covers had locked in the fully opened position though the attach tings on three of the
four covers on the left frustum had been bent to varying degrees by parachute riser emanglemem.
Note: a configuration change had been made to the fight frustum. The PR-1422 sealant/cap
closeouts had been eliminated from the majority of the fastener heads prior to the application of
ablator. There were no debonds, unbonds, or missing TPS associated with this change.
The forward skirts exhibited no debonds or missing TPS. RSS antennae covers/phenolic base
plates were intact. Hypalon paint was blistered/missing over the areas where B TA closeouts had
been applied. All frustum severance ring pins and retainer clips were intact.
The Field Joint Protection System (FJPS) closeouts were generally in good condition. Trailing
edge damage to the FIPS and the GEI cork runs were attributed to debris resulting from
severance of the nozzle extension.
Separation of the aft ET/SRB struts appeared normal. The stiffener tings, ETA tings, and IEA's
appeared undamaged by water impact. TPS on the external surface of both aft skirts was intact
and in good condition. During let_ aft skirt disassembly at Hangar AF, an Insta-Foam spray nozzle
was found embedded in the aft ring foam mid way between the actuators. Technicians recalled the
missing nozzle occurrence while performing the spraying operation, but did not find the nozzle
after an extensive search. This problem has since been corrected by changing the foam application
procedures and devising a nozzle tie-wrap retention system.
The holddown post Debris Containment Systems (DCS) appeared to have functioned normally.
However, the ItDP #2 DCS plunger was not fully seated though there was no visible obstruction.
The HDP #3 DCS plunger also was not seated and was obstructed by a frangible nut piece. There
were no stud hang-ups on this launch.
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Photo 13" Frustum Post Flight Condition
Both frustums were in excellent condition. No TPS was missing and no debonds/unbonds were
detected over fasteners. Virtually none of the Hypalon paint had blistered. All eight BSM aero
heat shield covers had locked in the fully opened position though the attach rings on three of the
four covers on the left frustum had been bent to varying degrees by parachute riser entanglement.
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Photo 14- Frustum Configuration Change
A config_aration change had been made to the fight frustum. The PR-1422 sealant/cap closeouts
had been eliminated from the majority of the fastener heads prior to the application of ablator.
There were no debonds, unbonds, or missing TPS associated with this change.
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Close-up view of fastener heads covered by TPS.
Note ten PR-1422 sealant/cap closeouts for comparison.
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Photo 16: Forward Skirt Post Flight Condition
The forward skirts exhibited no debonds or missing TPS. RSS antennae covers/phenolic base
plates were intact. Hypalon paint was blistered/missing over the areas where BTA closeouts had
been applied. All frustum severance ring pins and retainer clips were intact.
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7.0 ORBITER POST LANDING DEBRIS ASSESSMENT
A post landing inspection of OV-102 Columbia was conducted after the 7:20 a.m. eastern time
landing 5 December 1997, on the Kennedy Space Center SLF runway 33 and in the Orbiter
Processing Facility bay #3. This inspection was performed to identify debris impact damage and, if
possible, debris sources.
The Orbiter TPS sustained a total of 308 hits, of which 132 had a major dimension of 1-inch or
larger. This total does not include the numerous hits on the base heat shield attributed to SSME
vibration/acoustics and exhaust plume recirculation. A comparison of these numbers to statistics
from 72 previous missions of similar configuration (excluding missions STS-23, 24, 25, 26, 26R,
27R, 30R, and 42, which had damage from known debris sources), indicates both the total
number of hits and the number of hits 1-inch or larger was "out of family" (reference Figures 1-4).
The following table breaks down the STS-87 Orbiter debris damage by area:
HITS > 1" TOTAL HITS
Lower surface 109 244
Upper surface 0 7
Right side 5 6
Left side 3 4
Right OMS Pod 7 13
Left OMS Pod 7 20
Window Area 1 14
TOTALS 132 308
The Orbiter lower surface sustained at least 244 significant hits, of which 109 had a major
dimension of 1-inch or larger. Virtually all of this unusual damage was concentrated in the area
between the nose landing gear and the main landing gear more or less symmetrically divided
between left and fight outboard sides. The largest lower surface tile damage site was located on
the left glove. The site measured 15-inches long by 2-inches wide by 0.25-inches deep. The
deepest lower surface tile damage site was located just forward of the left main landing gear well.
It measured 4-inches long by 2-inches wide by 1.5-inches deep. Tile material in the damage sites
showed signs of glazing and heat effects from re-entry. The damage sites with significant depth
appeared to be generally aligned in a fore to aft direction. Many of these sites were affected by
re-entry aerodynamic erosion.
Unusual tile damage occurred on the lower outboard leading edges of both OMS pods. There
were 33 total hits, of which 14 were larger than 1-inch in size. However, there was no significant
tile damage on the leading edge of the vertical stabilizer.
In order to determine the cause of this damage, the on-orbit films (ET/ORB umbilical cameras and
crew hand-held still photographs) were reviewed and revealed significant loss of TPS from both
ET thrust panels - an NSTS-7700 violation and IFA (STS-87-T-1). Although numerous samples
were taken from tile damage sites on the Orbiter lower surface and two sites on the OMS pods
for chemical analysis, the results were inconclusive.
Tile damage sites around and aft of the LH2 and LO2 ET/ORB umbilicals were less than usual.
This damage was most likely caused by impacts from umbilical ice or shredded pieces of umbilical
purge barrier material flapping in the airstream.
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The tires, which exhibited some ply undercutting on the fight main inboard tire,
be in good condition for a landing on the KSC concrete runway.
were reposed to
ET/Orbiter separation devices EO-1, EO-2, and EO-3 functioned normally. No ordnance
fragments were found on the runway beneath the umbilical cavities. The EO-2 and EO-3 fitting
retainer springs were in nominal configuration. No clips were missing from the "salad bowls".
Virtually no umbilical closeout foam or white RTV dam material adhered to the umbilical plate
near the LH2 recirculation line disconnect.
The SSME #2 and #3 Dome Mounted Heat Shield (DMHS) closeout blankets were in good
condition. However, the bluet panels on S SME #1 at the 4-6"00 o'clock position were missing.
The underlying batting material was tom and frayed. Loss of this material in flight was detected in
the launch tracking films at T+39 seconds _T.
Some very small holes, or damage sites, were detected on the leading edges of fight wing RCC
panels # 11 and #19.
Hazing and streaking of forward-facing Orbiter windows was less than usual. Damage sites on the
window perimeter files was noticeably less than usual in quantity and size.
The post landing walkdown of Runway 33 was performed immediately after landing. No debris
concerns were identified. All drag chute hardware was recovered and appeared to have functioned
normally. The pyrotechnic devices on the reefing line cutters had been expended.
In summary, both the total number of Orbiter TPS debris hits and the number of hits 1-inch or
larger was "out of family" when compared to previous missions (reference Figures 5 and 6). Since
the same damage pattem occurred on STS-86, a trend was established that may involve the
change to NCFI 24-124 used on the thrust panels. An investigation team is also examining TPS
density and strength, structural loads and flexing of the thrust panels, aerodynamic loading, and
the flight environment.
As a result of this investigation, plug pull tests to verify material strength were performed on the
ET-90 (STS-89) thrust panels. All of the test results were within specification. Nevertheless, the
panels were then modified. The foam was machined/sanded to minimum drawing requirements
above the rib tops and the rind was removed in the rib valleys to improve the stress/strain
capability, eliminate a denser material layer, reduce the amount of potential debris material, and
reduce the foam height above the panel ribs to decrease the cross-flow air loading on the foam.
All of these measures were designed to eliminate or reduce the amount of TPS loss from the
thrust panels, and in turn reduce the amount of damage to Orbiter tiles.
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Figure 1" Orbiter Lower Surface Debris Damage Map
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Figure 3: Orbiter Right :Side Debris Damage Map
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Figure 5- Orbiter Post Flight Debris Damage Summary
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STS-23
STS-24
STS-25
STS-26
STS-26R
STS-27R
STS-30R
STS-42
STS-86
SIGNIFICANT DAMAGE CAUSED BY KNOWN DEBRIS SOURCES
LOWER SURFACE ENTIRE SURFACE CAUSE OR SOURCE'
HITS > 1 INCH TOTAL HITS HITS > 1 INCH TOTAL HITS
Not Available Not Available 46 152 ET Intertank TPS
Not Available Not Available 63 140 ET Intertank TPS
109 231 • 144 315 ET Intertank TPS
179 482 226 553 ET Intertank TPS
47 342 55 411
272 644 298 707
52 134 56 151
38 159 44 209
27 100 31 129
SRB DFI Cork Closeouts
SRB Nosecap Ablator
LH MLG Tire Rubber Pieces
ET Intertank TPS
ET Thrust Panel TPS
Figure 6- Orbiter Debris Exclusion Damage Summary
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Photo 18" Overall View Orbiter Right/Left Sides
_7

Photo 19° Overall View SSME's/BaseHeat Shield
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Photo 20: SSME #1 DMHS Blanket Damage
The blanket panels on SS)¢_ #1 at the 4-6:00 o'clock position were missing. The underlying
batting material was torn and frayed. Loss of this material in flight was detected in the launch
tracking films at T+39 seconds MET.
99
11 i ¸ ! _ i ! i _ii, •
Photo 21" Lower Surface Tile Damage
The Orbiter lower surface sustained at least 244 significant hits, of which 109 had a major
dimension of 1-inch or larger. Virtually all of this unusual damage was concentrated in the area
between the nose landing gear and the main landing gear more or less symmetrically divided
between let_ (top photo) and fight (bottom photo) outboard sides. The largest lower surface tile
damage site was located on the left glove. The site measured 15-inches long by 2-inches wide by
0.25-inches deep.
4O

i ¸¸: ;
Photo 22: Lower Surface Tile Damage
The deepest lower surface tile damage site was located just forward of the left main landing gear
well. It measured 4-inches long by 2-inches wide by 1.5-inches deep. Tile material in the damage
sites showed signs of glazing and heat effects from re-entry. The damage sites with significant
depth appeared to be generally aligned in a fore to aft direction. Many of these sites-were affected
by re-entry aerodynamic erosion.
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Photo 23: OMS Pod Tile Damage
Unusual tile damage occurred on the lower outboard leading edges of both OMS pods. There
were 33 total bits, of which 14 were larger than 1-inch in size.
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Photo 24: Windows and Perimeter Tiles
Hazing and streaking of forward-facing Orbiter windows was less than usual. Damage sites on the
window perimeter tiles was noticeably less than usual in quantity and size.
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1.0 STS,87(0V-102 ) Film/Video Screening and Timing Summaries
lo STS-87 (OV-102): FILM/VIDEO SCREENING AND TIMING
SUMMARY
i- ¸
SCREENING ACT1VIT_S
1.1.1 Launch
The STS-87 launch of Columbia (OV-102) from pad B occurred on Wednesday,
November 19, 1997 (day 323) at 19"46:00..001 Coordinated Universal Time
(UTC), as seen on camera E9. Solid Rocket Booster (SRB) separation occurred
at 19:48:03.7 UTC, as seen on camera ET212.
On launch day, 24 of the 24 expected videos were received and screened.
Following launch day, 21 films were screened. Twenty-one additional films
were received for contingency support and anomaly resolution, but were not
screened. A Dome Mounted Heat Shield (DMHS) closeout blanket was seen to
detach at the 5 o'clock position of SSME #1 during ascent. With the possible
exception of the detached DMHS blanket, no anomalies that could threaten
vehicle safety were seen on the launch imagery.
Photography of the left SRB and the LSRB/ET aft attach and the external tank aft
dome was acquired using umbilical well camera films. Handheld still
photography of the ET was acquired. During post-flight analysis of the handheld
photography of the ET, extensive damage to the TPS on the left and fight ET
intertank thrust panels was observed. A handheld video of the ET following
separation was also acquired. Venting from the ET intertank was clearly visible
on the handheld video. The tumbling and rolling motion of the ET appeared
greater than typically seen on previous missions.
Numerous pieces of debris (probably ice) are visible throughout the video
sequence.
1.1.2 On-Orbit
Accidental rotation rates were imparted to the Spartan satellite when the grapple
attempt failed on November 21, 1997. At the request of the MER manager, the
rotation rates of the Spartan satellite around each of the primary axes were
determined using downlinked video from the end effector camera. These rates
were used in the planning for the EVA to capture Spartan. After Spartan had
been successfully captured, the MER manager made a follow-up request that the
Spartan rotation rates be determined just prior to the EVA capture. Using
downlink video from Payload Bay camera D, the rotation rates about each of
Spartan's primary axes were again determined. The second set of rotation rate
data was used in the planning for a possible re-deploy of Spartan. Section 2.5.1
contains the results of the Spartan rotation rate analysis.
1.1.3 Landing
Columbia made an early morning landing on runway 33 at the KSC Shuttle
Landing Facility on December 5, 1997. Twelve videos were received and
screened. Following landing, ten films were screened.
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Although not considered anomalous, APU venting was seen during the approach
through roll-out and wheel stop. Flames were seen coming from the APU vent
after wheel stop until APU shutdown.
The drag chute deployment appeared normal.
1.1.4 Post Landing
More than typic_ instances of Orbiter tile damage on the left and fight outboard
sections of _e Orbiter underbody were seen on _e post landing walk around
inspection video. Tile d_aged areas obse_ed include: a forward to aft, linear
tile damage pattern on the left Orbiter underbody from a point aft of the nose
RCS thrusters to a point aft of the left wing root, tile damage on the inboard
sections of the leading edges of both wings, and several possible instances of tile
damage on the top surface of the left wing immediately aft of leading edge.
Other tile damage included damage on the fo_ard surface of both the left and
fight OMS pods, ne_ _e LH2 umbilical well, ne_ Orbiter window #4, on the
starbo_d main landing gear door, near the LH2 umbilical well, on _e upper
surface of the body flap, and on aft surface of _e left RCS stinger. A _ssing
section of closeout blanket panel was visible at _e five o'clock position of the
SSME #I Dome Mounted Heat Shield (DMHS). Normal tile erosion was visible
on the base heat shield. An area of brown discoloration was visible on the
fo__d upper edge of left payload bay door. The fires appeared to be in good
condition.
1.1.5 STS-87 Orbiter Damage Investigation
The M_anager, Space Shuttle Program requested that the Space Shuttle
Systems Integration Office conduct an expedited investigation of all potential
contributors to the in excess of 300 damage locations found on Orbiter tiles
during _e post-landing inspection. The investigation was to review the findings,
most probable cause, and provide recommendations for corrective action prior to
the STS-89 Flight Readiness Review.
Section 2.6 contains a summary of the image analysis support provided to the
STS-87 Orbiter damage investigation by SN3/Image Science and Analysis
Group, Space Science Branch.
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TIMING ACTIVITIES
The time codes from videos and films were used to identify specific events during
the screening process.
The landing and drag chute event times are provided in Table 1.2.
Event Description Time (UTC) Camera
Landing Gear Doors Opened
Left Main Wheel Touchdown
339:12:19:44.119 EL30
339:12:20:03.908 EL2
Right Main Wheel Touchdown 339:12:20:04.041 EL9
Drag Chute Initiation 339:12:'20:07.436 EL9
Pilot Chute at Full Inflation 339" 12:20:08.290 EL12
Bag Release 339:12:20:08.957 EL2
Drag Chute Inflation in Reefed
Configuration
Drag Chute Inflation in Disreefed
Configuration
Nose Gear Touchdown
339:12:20:10.019 EL9
339"12:20"13.314 EL9
339" 12:20:14.376 EL12
Drag Chute Release 339:12:20:37.627 EL1
Wheel Stop 339:12:21"00.869 EL4
Table 1.2 Landing Events Timing
STS-87 JSC Summary Report A7

Summary of Significant Events
. . i -
o SUMMARY OF SIGNIFICANT EVENTS
DEBRIS FROM SSME IGNITION THROUGH LIFTOFF
As on previous missions, multiple pieces of debris were seen near the time of
SSME ignition to liftoff (umbilical ice debris, RCS paper, SRB flame duct and
water baffle debris). No damage to the vehicle was noted. No follow-up action
was requested.
Figure 2.1 (A) Umbilical Ice StriNng LH2 Umbilical Door Sill
Multiple pieces of ice debris were seen falling from the ET/Orbiter umbilicals
during SSME ignition. An ice/frost finger from a LH2 umbilical purge vent fell aft
and contacted the LH2 press line (-19:45:56.6 UTC)and then struck the LH2
umbilical door sill. Three other pieces of umbilical ice debris were seen to strike
the ET/Orbiter LH2 umbilical door sill (-19:45:56.4 through 19:45:58.0 UTC). A
single piece of umbilical ice debris was seen to strike the LH2 four-inch
recirculation line at-19:45:56.65 UTC. No damage to the press line, the door sill,
or the four-inch recirculation line was visible. (Cameras OTV 109, OTV 163, E31)
Multiple of pieces of light colored debris were seen near the RSRB at SRB
ignition. These debris were not seen to contact the vehicle. (Camera E5)
A large piece of light-colored debris (probably instafoam) was seen near the
RSRB aft skirt moving toward the FSS during lift off (-19:46:02.8 UTC). A
rope like piece of debris (probably water baffle material) was seen in the exhaust
cloud after liftoff (-19:46:03 UTC). (Cameras El, E4)
A single piece of light-colored debris (possibly metallic) was seen in the exhaust
cloud after lift off (-19:46:10.7 UTC). (Camera E76)
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DEBRIS DURING ASCENT
Multiple pieces of debris (probably umbilical ice and RCS paper) fell aft of the
launch vehicle after liftoff, through the roll maneuver, and beyond. The debris
appeared similar to that seen on previous missions. The debris seen was not in
sufficient concentration to have been from the damaged ET or to have caused the
Orbiter tile damage seen post-flight (see Section 2.6). None of the debris was seen
to contact the vehicle. Intermittent clouds obscured the tracking camera views of
the launch vehicle during ascent. No follow-up action was requested. (Cameras
El, E5, E52, E207, E212, E222, E223, E224).
Several pieces of light colored debris were noted falling aft of the body flap after
the roll maneuver (-19:46:15.8 UTC). A debris induced flash was seen in the
SSME exhaust plume during ascent (19:46:16.950 UTC). (Camera E52).
MOBILE LAUNCH PLATFORM (MLP) EVENTS
The SSME Mach diamonds did not appear to form in the expected sequence as
seen on Camera E19 and recorded in Table 2.3. No follow-up action was
requested.
SSME TIME (UTC)
SSME #2 19:45:56.844
SSME #3 19:45"56.905
SSME #1 19:45"57.036
Table 2.3 Mach Diamond Formation
Figure 2.3 (A) Orange Vapor During SSME Ignition
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Orange vapor, probably flee burning hydrogen, was seen forward of the SSME
rims and near the base heat shield during SSME ignition (-19:45:54.7 UTC).
Orange vapors have been seen on previous missions. (E2, E5, El7, E19, E20,
OTV170)
Several small areas of TPS erosion on the base shield were noted near SSME # 2
and SSME #3 after SSME ignition. (Cameras El7, El8).
2.4 ASCENT EVENTS
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Figure 2.4 (A) Umbilical Purge Barrier Material
A piece of umbilical purge barrier material was seen to detach and travel toward
the LSRB before falling aft (-19:46:18.7 UTC).
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Figure 2.4 (B) Umbilical Purge Barrier Material Adhered to Base Heat Shield
A single piece of debris (possibly umbilical purge barrier material) first seen near
the body flap, moved laterally into the SSME exhaust plume, broke into multiple
pieces, and fell aft (19:46:24.189 UTC). (Camera ET207)
After the roll maneuver, a single piece of umbilical purge barrier material, first
seen aft of SSME #2, traveled forward and adhered to the base heat shield outboard
of SSME #2. No base heat shield tile damage at this location was reported in the
STS-87 KSC Orbiter Post Landing Inspection Debris Assessment report.
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Figure 2.4 (C) Partially Detached Dome Mounted Heat Shield (DMHS) CIoseout
Bla_et
A Dome Mounted Heat Shield (DMHS) closeout blanket was seen to partially
detach at the 5 o'clock position of SSME #I at ~19:46:20.7 UTC.
Figure 2.4 (D)Detached DMHS Closeout Blanket
ii i _
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The DMHS blanket tore loose and fell aft at approximately -19:46"39 UTC. The
falling blanket induced orange-colored streaks in the SSME exhaust plume.
(KTV4B, KTV21B, ET204, ET207, E207, E213, E222, E223).
Body flap motion (less than usual) was seen during ascent. (Camera E207).
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ON-ORBIT EVENTS
2.5.1 Spartan Rotation Rates
When the on-orbit attempt to grapple the Spartan satellite failed, accidental
rotations were imparted to it. Using downlinked video from the end effector
camera, an analysis of the rotation rates about each of Spartan's primary axes
was performed. The rotation rates were derived using six digitized video frames
with known relative times. Figure 2.5.1 and Table 2.5.1 (A) summarizes the
findings of the analysis (a positive rotation is defined as a clockwise motion as
viewed from the origin looking in the direction of the positive axis). The
accuracy of these numbers was estimated to be approximately +/-0.02 deg/sec.
Figure 2.5.1 Spartan Rotation Rates after Failed Grapple
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Axis Rotation Rate
(deg/sec)
X -1.91
Y +0.13
Z +0.06
Table 2.5.1 (A) Spartan Rotation Rates after Failed Grapple
The Spartan rotation rates were also determined just prior to the EVA capture.
Using downlink video from Payload Bay camera D, the rotation rates about each
of Spartan's primary axes were determined. This second set of rotation rate data
was used in the planning for a possible re-deploy of Spartan. Table 2.5.1(B)
contains the rotation rates that were determined just prior to the EVA capture.
Axis Rotation Rate
(deg/sec)
X +0.02
Y -0.06
Z +0.03
i _.
Table 2.5.1 (B) Spartan Rotation Rates Prior to EVA Capture
OV-102 DAMAGE INVESTIGATION
This section is a summary of the image analysis tasks performed by SN3/Image
Science and Analysis Group, Space Science Branch in support of the
investigation of the source of the STS-87 Orbiter tile damage found during the
post-landing inspection.
The investigation board was provided with imagery products, image
enhancements, and imagery analysis support of: (1) the Space Shuttle (OV-102)
during launch from ground tracking camera films, (2) the post-separation ET
(from the Orbiter umbilical well and the crew handheld cameras), (3) umbilical
camera views of the SRBs at separation, (4) crew acquired on-orbit images of the
OMS pods, (5) timelines of the ET venting seen on the handheld ET imagery,
and (6) a summary of the observed ET tumble rates. A preflight
meteoroid/orbital debris risk assessment prepared by SN3 Space Science Branch
was also provided to the board.
The damage to the ET thrust panel TPS seen on the crew handheld photography
was ultimately determined by the investigation board to be the probable cause of
a significant portion of the Orbiter fuselage tile damage.
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2.6.10nboard Photography of the External Tank
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2.6.1.1 Analysis of the Umbilical Well Camera Films
Three rolls of umbilical well camera films from mission STS-87 were received at
JSC on December 6, 1997" the 16mm film (5mm lens) and the I6mm film
(10mm lens) from the LH2 umbilical, and the 35mm film from the LO2
umbilical well camera. The +X translation maneuver was performed on STS-87.
Figure 2.6.1.1 (A) 16mm Umbilical Well Camera Film (5mm Lens) of ET
16mm films:
No damage to the Orbiter side of the ET (+Z) or the visible forward portion of
the SRBs was seen on the 16mm umbilical well films that would account for the
tile damage found on the Orbiter after landing. No indications of vapor were
seen on the ET film sequence. Although the GH2 vent on the ET intertank was
not visible from the umbilical well camera perspective, it appeared that if venting
similar to that seen on the downlink video had been present it should have been
detected (see section 2.6.1.3). No unusual motions of the ET could be discerned
during the 16mm film separation sequence when compared to identical views
acquired on previous missions.
Less than usual divots were seen on the ET surface areas. Two light colored
marks (possibly divots) were seen on the intertank acreage between the +Z aero
vent and the RSS antenna. Small erosion marks or divots were seen on the LO2
aft feedline flange closeouts. A light area (possibly a divot) was seen on the -Y
limb of the intertank near the LSRB forward attach fitting. Several divots were
seen on the -Y thrust strut and flange closeout. Numerous light colored pieces of
debris (probably insulation and frozen hydrogen) were seen throughout the ET
separation sequence. No anomalies were noted on the face of the LH2 umbilical
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after ET separation (the LH2 umbilical interface plate appeared similar to
previous mission views). As typically seen on previous missions, frozen
hydrogen was noted on the orifice of the LH2 17 inch connect.
Good coverage of the LSRB separation and the tip of the RSRB was acquired on
the 16mm films. Numerous light-colored pieces of debris (insulation and frozen
hydrogen) and dark debris (probably charred insulation) were seen throughout
the 16mm film sequence. Numerous irregularly-shaped pieces of debris (charred
insulation) were noted near the base of the LSRB electric cable tray prior to SRB
separation. Charred TPS was seen on the aft surface of the -Y upper strut fairing
prior to SRB separation. Typical ablation of the ET/Orbiter LH2 umbilical
electric cable tray and the aft surface of the horizontal section of the -Y ET/SRB
vertical strut was seen. Normal blistering of the fire barrier material on the
outboard side of the LH2 umbilical was seen. Ablation of the TPS on the aft
dome was normal. TPS ablation or small aero-heating erosion marks on the ET
aft dome may be slightly more than typically seen.
Figure 2.6.1.1 (B) 16mm Umbilical Well Camera Film (5mm Lens) View of
SRB Separation
The LSRB separation appeared normal. The SRB nose caps were visible during
SRB separation.
STS-87 was the first flight where the umbilical well cameras imaged the external
tank from the roll-to-heads-up position. The film exposure of external tank is
dark while the ET is in the shadow of the Orbiter. After ET separation, the ET
comes into sunlight and the exposure is good. The film quality of the SRB
separation sequence on the 16mm films is good until after SRB separation when
the exposure becomes dark. The 16mm umbilical well films have good focus.
OV-102 is not configured for timing data on the 16mm umbilical well cameras.
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35mm Umbilical Well Camera Film:
Figure 2.6.1.1 (C)35mm Umbilical Well Camera Film View of Forward ET
The 35mm STS-87 umbilical well camera film of the external tank from the
Orbiter LO2 umbilical well was reviewed at JSC on December 7, 1997.
Excellent quality views of the ET from the LO2 umbilical forward to the tip of
the ET nose were acquired. As planned, a total of 59 image frames were
recorded. Overall, the +Z ET TPS appeared to be in good condition. No
anomalies were noted on the face of the LO2 umbilical (the LO2 umbilical
interface plate appeared similar to previous mission views). The ET/Orbiter
attach bipod closeouts appeared normal. The LO2 feedline, cable tray, PAL
ramps, press lines, and ET nose cone appeared in good condition.
Multiple white-colored marks (TPS damage), including several divots, were seen
on the on the 35 mm umbilical well film on the +Y ET thrust panel near the
RSRB forward attach. Better views of this damage were acquired with the crew
handheld photography. The investigation team concluded that the thrust panel
damage near the RSRB forward attach accounted for the damage found on the
fuselage tiles along the fight side of Orbiter after landing. (The -Y ET thrust
panel near the LSRB forward attach was not imaged on the 35mm umbilical well
camera film). No indications of vapor were seen on the 35mm film. No unusual
motions of the ET could be discerned on the 35 mm film when compared to
identical views acquired on previous missions.
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Other items noted on the 35mm umbilical well camera film, although not
consider anomalous, include:
• Approximately 60 to 70 percent of the visible ET aft dome TPS surface area
was covered with small, white-colored "popcorn" divots.
• Several small divots were seen on the +Y vertical section of the electrical
cable tray adjacent to the LO2 umbilical.
• A divot, approximately 3 inches in length, was seen just above the LO2
umbilical between the +Y ends of the diagonal strut and the cross beam.
• Multiple small divots (less than 1 inch in size) were seen on the LO2 aft
feedline flange closeouts.
• On frames 14 -17, a thin white-colored string-like debris object (estimated to
be approximately 30 inches in length) was seen near the base of the LO2
feedline just forward of the cross beam. A similar string-like object was
previously seen on the STS-78 35mm umbilical well film.
• Several small shallow appearing divots (approximately 1 inch in size) were
seen on the base and the forward-end of the +Y thrust strut.
• Multiple very small white-colored "popcorn" aero heating or erosion marks
were seen on the lower LH2 tank TPS. These marks were not visible on the
pre-launch close-out photography.
• A shallow divot, approximately 3 inches in size, was seen on the LH2 /
intertank closeout flange in the +Y direction from the LO2 feedline.
• Approximately seven small shallow divots (approximately 1 inch in size)
were seen on the intertank stringer heads just forward of the ET / Orbiter
attach bipod.
• A divot, approximately 1 to 2 inches in size, was seen near the +Z aero vent.
• A divot, approximately 8 inches in length, was seen on a forward intertank
stringer head between the +Z aero vent and the RSS antennae (approximate
station XT 750).
The 35mm umbilical well film is of excellent quality, with good exposure and
focus.
2.6.1.2 Analysis of the Handheld Photography of the ET
Fifty-three images of the ET were acquired using the handheld 70 mm
Hasselblad camera with the 250mm lens images (magazine 705). The exposure
and focus of the photography is good. However on many of the images, a
substantial portion of the ET is in shadow (detail not visible) because of the sun
angle. Views of the sides, nose and aft dome of the ET were acquired. Timing
data is not present on the handheld film. The normal SRB separation bum scars
and aero-heating marks, were noted on the ET TPS. The ET was measured to be
1.1 km distance from the Orbiter on the first picture. The astronauts performed a
manual pitch maneuver from the heads-up position to bring the ET into view in
the Orbiter overhead windows (STS-87 was the first flight with the roll-to-heads-
up maneuver).
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Figure 2.6.1.2 (A) Damage to the ET +Y Intertank Thrust Panel
Damage to the ET intertank TPS was noted. The damaged areas are visible on
both the +Y and -Y intertank t_st panels near the forward left and fight SRB
attach fittings and extend forward and aft from the attach points for almost the
entire width of the intertank.
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Figure 2.6.1.2 (B)Damage to the ET -Y Intertank Thrust Panel
The damaged areas appeared to consist of multiple white-colored divots. A
separate large, bright, light-blue-colored area estimated to be approximately 100
inches in length, was noted on the ET intertank-Y/-Z axis. The presence of
exposed substrate in the damaged area could not be confirmed from the imagery.
No indication of structural damage was noted.
_:__ ! !iii_i_!I_ ,
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2.6.1.3 Analysis of the ET Venting Seen on the Crew Handheld Imagery
Figure 2.6.1.3 (A) ET Venting Seen on the Hasselblad Camera Film
Venting from the intertank in the vicinity of the GH2 vent (-Y axis) is visible on
the Hasselblad film. The venting is present on two separate sequences of frames.
After a close review of the STS-87 ET film it was determined that the first sign
of ET venting was evident in the ninth frame (image reference $87-705-009).
The distance to the ET was calculated to be 5336 feet on this image. This
estimate was based on the measured image/object scale and the 250 mm lens
used for the photography. The expected error is approximately +4 %.
2.6.1.4 Analysis of the Camcorder Video of the ET
One minute and forty-three seconds of post-separation downlink video of the ET
taken by the astronauts were received on November 21, 1997. Vapor venting from
the intertank region near the GH2 vent of the STS-87 external tank (ET) is visible
in the video. Numerous pieces of debris (more than typically seen) are visible
throughout the video sequence. Some of the debris (probably ice) is out of focus
suggesting a close proximity to the Orbiter window. The tumbling and rolling
motion of the ET was greater than typically seen on previous missions (see section
2.6.1.6). Timing data is not present on the downlink video but is present on the on-
board video received after landing.
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2.6.1.5 Analysis of STS-87 External Tank Separation Distances
To assist in the investigation of the STS-87 ET venting _d tumbling observed
post-ET separation, measurements of the ET separation distances in relation to
the observed intertank GH2 venting were made. The imagery used for this
analysis was the Orbiter umbilical well film (16 mm film with 10 mm lens), the
crew handheld photography (Hasselblad roll STS-87-705), and the onboard
camcorder video tape (STS-87 #001). The MET times of the ET imagery
acquisitions are shown in Figure 2.6.1.5 (A).
STS-87 ET Image Acquisation Time-Line
(Minutes- Seconds MET)
Launch
Umbilical
ET Seperation 16ram w/10mm
, Umbilical / Umbilical
, w' mm
00:00 08:49 09:381
09:50
Umbilical *
Cameras
Hasselblad Hasselblad
First Frame Best Correlation with Video
(estimated) @ 16:50, 17:00, 17:12, and 17:18
Video / Video
Last Frame
16:00 i
16:38
Hand Held
Cameras
Figure 2.6.1.5 (A) ET Image Acquisition Timeline
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The ET separation distance versus time was measured from the 16 mm umbilical
well film using the ET intertank diameter as the scale reference. The first
reliable ET diameter measurement in the film sequence was at 9 seconds post-
separation, and the last reliable ET diameter measurement was at 42 seconds.
250
200
A
_150
H 100
50
y = 4.2322x + 9.0239
STS-87: ET Separation
(16 mm umbilical film w/lO mm lens)
i Extrapolated for ]_the last ET frame ....
,/
/
/
/
//
/
Distance = 218 feet
Time = 49.42 seconds |
'1
0 i I
0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50
Time from ET Separation (seconds)
Figure 2.6.1.5 (B) Distance of ET vs. Time on 16 mm Umbilical Well Camera
Film ( 10mm Lens)
The ET distance from the Orbiter versus time from separation is shown in Figure
2.6.1.5 (B). The ET separation rate was approximately constant over the film
sequence at 4.4 feet per second. At 49 seconds post-separation, only the tip of
the ET nose cap was visible before the ET moved out of the field of view. By
extrapolation (see Figure 2.6.1.5 (B)), the ET was at a distance from the Orbiter
of 218 feet +/- 3 feet when last viewed by the umbilical well camera.
ET venting was not observed in the umbilical well film sequence, nor do there
appear to be ET tumble or roll rates that would suggest venting occurred from the
GH2 intertank vent. Therefore it was concluded that there was no significant ET
GH2 intertank venting within the first 49 seconds (218 feet) post-ET separation.
Table 2.6.1.5 (A) provides the ET separation distance, time, and rate of
separation for the umbilical well films.
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Umbilical Focal Frame Rate Time Maximum Separation
Film Length (frame s/se c) (sec) Range (ft) Rate
Came m (mm) (ft/s ec)
16 mm 10 240 49.42 218 4. 4
35 mm 55 2. 1 28. 10 125 4. 4
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Table 2.6.1.5 (A) ET Separation Distance on 16mm and 35mm Umbilical Well
Film.
The use of handheld photography, although of good quality, was limited for this
analysis due to the lack of timing data on the film. An indirect method of
obtaining handheld photography timing was partially successful. This method
involved correlating the handheld photography frames with the camcorder video
frames (with timing), but was hampered by a combination of poor video quality
and poor ET lighting conditions. The ET distances from the Orbiter were
measured from the handheld photography using the diameter of the ET intertank
as the scale reference.
=
A 1"70
E 1.50
oo
E 1.30
=
o
0.70
0.50 . "
0:15:30
STS-87 Camera to External Tank
Distance
Camcorder Video Start
I
. . ._=_ a'"a
, ,,_-.i""
705-01 Estimatect
• : .
0:15:47 0:16:05 0:16:22 0:16:39
Mi==lion Elaple Time (Hour:Mlnutell:Seeondll)
-=_-,Measured from '
Handheld Photo
Extrapolated
0:16:56 0:17:14
Figure 2.6.1.5 (C) Measured ET Distances from the Orbiter vs. Time
The ET distance was measured from four frames of handheld photography (705-
01,705-06, 705-09, 705-17). Three of these frames (705-06, 705-09, 705- I7)
were also successfully correlated with camcorder video frames to obtain timing.
The measured ET distances from the Orbiter versus time in MET are shown in
Figure 2.6.1.5 (C). Handheld photography frame 705-06 was taken at about
16:38 MET, corresponding to the time that the camcorder video of the ET
begins. At this time, the ET was at a distance of approximately 1.5 km (4900
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feet), separating from the Orbiter at 33 feet per second. The first handheld frame
of the ET, 705-01, was taken prior to the video start, therefore its timing using
the camcorder video is not possible. The ET distance for frame 705-01 was
measured to be 1.1 km (3600 feet). Using the measured separation rate from
handheld frames 705-06, 705-09, and 705-17 and extrapolating forward in time
yields an estimated time for the first handheld frame, 705-01, of about 16:00
MET, as shown in Figure 2.6.1.5 (C)
In her post-flight debrief statements, astronaut Chawla recalls that the ET
"tumbling and venting were unusual" when she first observed and photographed
the ET. Therefore, it was inferred that the first visual observation by the crew of
ET venting was at about the time of handheld frame 705-01; 16:00 MET (3600
feet). However, ET venting is not evident in the first eight handheld frames and
is first observed in handheld frame 705-09 (MET 16:50, 5250 feet). ET venting
is observed at the beginning of the camcorder video sequence (16:38 MET, 4900
feet). Therefore the first observation of venting in any imagery is with the
camcorder video. Also, there is indirect evidence from the observed ET tumble
rate (see section 2.6.1.6) that venting began prior to 16:38 MET.
In conclusion, from the available imagery, it was not possible to determine the
time or ET distance for when the ET GH2 intertank venting began. However,
based upon the available imagery and crew recollections, it was concluded that
venting began after 9:24 MET (distance of 218 feet) and before 16:00 MET
(distance of about 3600 feet).
2.6.1.6 Video Analysis of STS-87 ET Tumble Rates
To assist in the investigation of the STS-87 ET venting and tumbling observed
post-ET separation, measurements of the ET tumble rates were made.
The rate of ET tumble, i.e., the end-to-end rotation of the ET about its center of
mass, was measured using camcorder video recorded onboard by the crew. The
video tape used in this task was onboard tape STS-87 #001 (Reference Master
615161). The ET was in view in the video beginning at 00:16:38 MET. The ET
was out of view at 00:18:21 MET as it entered into the terminator darkness. The
ET was observed to tumble approximately 2.5 cycles over the entire video
sequence. The axis of rotation was approximately the Z axis. No significant roll
about the X axis was observed. Intermittent venting from the intertank GH2 vent
was observed throughout the sequence. From the observed orientation of the
venting relative to the tumble motion, one can infer that the vent force was
perpendicular to the axis of rotation and would have increased the angular
rotation rate.
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Figure 2.6.1.6 (A) ET Venting and Tumble Rates vs. MET
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Figure 2.6.1.6 (A) shows the measured ET tumble rate versus MET. Each data
point represents the average tumble rate over the preceding half cycle of ET
tumble (180 degrees of rotation), denoted by T1 through T5. For example, for
the first full half cycle, T1, the ET tumbled 180 degrees over the time interval
from MET 16:52.8 to 17:12.4, for an average tumble rate of 9.2 degrees per
second over that interval. The uncertainty in each of the T1 through T5 rates is
+/-0. t degrees per second. The initial average rate, TO, was measured over one
quarter cycle of ET rotation, beginning about when the ET was first in view. The
larger error bars for TO (+0.3, -0.6) are due to the relatively poor quality of video
at the start of the sequence.
Also shown on Figure 2.6.1.6 (A) are the four observed intervals of near-
continuous venting, denoted by events V0 through V3. The most pronounced
venting, V1, spans all of T2 and the majority of T1 and coincides with the
observed ET angular acceleration over those intervals.
The major venting event, V1 began with an intense burst at 17:00 MET. The
intense venting was continuous for at least 20 seconds, then the venting slowly
tapered off and ends at MET 17:32. This event accounts for the observed
increase in ET tumble rate from an average of approximately 6.7 degrees per
second to 10.6 degrees per second, as shown in Figure 2.6.1.6 (A).
Table 2.6.i.6 is a timeline summary of the venting events, showing their
correlation with the rate measurement intervals and with time (MET and time
relative to the time the ET was first in view). The qualitative properties of the
events are in the comments. Of note is the intermittent nature of the venting, as
indicated by several very short duration (1 second or less) venting bursts.
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I' If MET Relative time [
I Ha Cycles HRS:MIN:SEC (Seconds) Comments I
" 00:16:38 0.0 E:T image Acqui_fion Of Vehicle • (AOV):1Fi,tredVideo. Sync $87-705- .... . • " i[
00:16:42 4.1 No venting noted ]
: 00:16:50, .... I2.0-. " _lm./Video Sync $87=705:09 ' ' ' ,.. . " i00:I6:53 14.8 Ti0 Forward tNo Ventin_t
HII
T1 00:16:53 14.8 Tip Forward (No Venting) 1
i ! 00:..!7:00 ...............S" 21,6 .......................Majd_, Venting Bun (atoag ¢ame:ra .... I
"I2•
00:17:35 57.1
00:17:35 57.3
00:17:36 58.0
00:17:36
00:17:37
T4 00:17:46
58.3
Venting starts
Large Burst
Camera -ET Separation
58.8
00:17:43 65.2 ET image AOV (No ventin_
00:17:46 68.1 No ventin_ observed
68.1 No venting observed
No Ventin_ observed
ET image Loss of Vehicle (LOV) No ventin[
• - _:_.7:as _ _9.s...............Ve_i_.,=_T_iia_;T6i:,:_., ................................................................................................................._ V9
====================================================:..........................................................:::::.:............... :.::.... .. .... ..............................:....... ...................._.._:.._::...:_..... . .............. _............ - ,,,.,,.
00:17:54 75.5 Venting starts
00:17:.54 76.3 Ventings ends
Table 2.6.1.6 ET Venting Timeline
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Figure 2.6.1.6 (B)ET Venting
Figure 2.6.1.6 (B)shows venting sequences, that are separated by 1/30th of a
second (0.033 seconds). This venting event was identified as a large burst that
lasted less than six video frames from MET 17:47.833 through 17:48.033. In
Table 2.6.1.6, this venting event was identified in the V2 region.
2.6.1.7 Review of Previous Missions with ET Venting
A review of previous mission records showed that venting from the ET intertank
region was previously seen on STS-45 (the intertank venting on STS-45 was
insignificant compared to that seen on STS-87). Also, venting from the aft
umbilical area of the ET was previously seen on STS-45, STS-53, STS-66, and
STS-68. The following is the launch times and inclinations for the missions
where ET venting was seen:
STS-45 Launch 08:13 EST, 57 degree inclination.
STS-53 Launch 08:24 EST, 57 degree inclination.
STS-66 Launch 12:00 EDT, 57 degree inclination.
STS-68 Launch 07:16 EDT, 57 degree inclination.
STS-87 Launch 14:46 EST, 28 degree inclination.
2.6.2 On-Orbit Imagery of OMS Pod Damage
On-orbit imagery of the payload bay was screened for views of the OMS pods.
The purpose was to document the earliest time the damage found post-landing on
the OMS pods was imaged.
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Figure 2.6.2 On-Orbit View of OMS Pod Damage
The OMS pod damage seen post-landing is clearly visible on STS-87 Hasselblad
Roll 752, frame 19. This photograph was taken two days prior to landing
(December 3, 1997) and confirms that the OMS pod damage did not occur during
late on-orbit flight, re-entry, or landing. The on-orbit video taken after launch
did not provide an adequate view of the OMS pod for tile damage assessment.
2.6.3 Ground Camera Tracking Views of Shuttle Launch Vehicle
The STS-87 ground based long range tracking camera screening sheets and
selected films and videos were reviewed for debris or other evidence that could
be related to the damage seen to the ET intertank on the on-board ET handheld
photography. None was found. However, clouds intermittently obscured the
Shuttle Launch Vehicle during ascent after approximately 57 seconds MET.
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2.6.3.1 Intermediate Range Tracking Camera Views of the ET Intertank Region
Figure 2.6.3.1 View of ET Intertank after Liftoff
Excellent quality views of the left and right ET intertank thrust panel regions
were acquired on the perimeter cameras E54 and E57 at approximately 12
seconds MET. The left and fight ET intertamk thruster panels were confirmed to
be undamaged at approximately 12 seconds MET from these views.
2.6.3.2 Long Range Tracking Camera View of the ET Intertank Region
Figure 2.6.3.2 Post SRB Separation View of ET Intertank
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2.0 Summary of Significant Events
The long range tracking camera E212 film imaged the ET intertank region just
after SRB separation. However the image resolution was not sufficient to
confirm the presence or absence of the intertank thrust panel damage.
LANDING EVENTS
2.7.1 Landing Sink Rate Analysis
Film camera EL9 was used to determine the landing sink rate of the Orbiter main
gear and camera film EL 1 was used to determine the nose gear sink rate. The sink
rates of the Orbiter were determined over a one-second time period prior to main
and nose gear touchdown.
The measured main gear sink rate values were found to be below the maximum
allowable values of 9.6 ft/sec for a 211,000 lb vehicle and 6.0 ft/sec for a 240,000
lb vehicle (the landing weight of the STS-87 Orbiter was reported to be 233,089
lb). The sink rate measurements for STS-87 are given in Table 2.7.1. In Figure
2.7.1 (A), and 2.7.1 (B), the trend of the measured data points for the image data is
illustrated.
Sink Rate Prior to Touchdown
(1 Second)
Main Gear 1.1 ft/sec.
Nose Gear 3.1 ft/sec.
Table 2.7.1 Sink Rate Measurements
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STS-87 Main Gear Landing Sink Rate
(Camera EL-9)
2.5
2
1.5
1
0
-0.5- 1
1.1 ft/s
T 1.2 ft/s
1.5 ft/s
-0.9 -0.8 -0.7 -0.6 -0.5 -0.4 -0.3 -0.2 -0.1 0
Time relative to main gear touchdown (seconds)
-_-----height _trend l.Os trend 0.5s trend 0.25s
Figure 2.7. t (A) Main Gear Height versus Time Prior to Touchdown
STS-87 Nose Gear Landing Sink Rate
(Camera EL-I)
1.5
1.0
0.5
0.0
-1
3.1 ft/s
__ _'_ 3.7 ft/s
47 ft/s
-0.9 -0.8 -0.7 -0.6 -0.5 -0.4 -0.3 -0.2-0.1 0
Time relative to nose gear touchdown (seconds)
_height _trend 1.0s ......... trend 0.5s "- " "trend 0.25s
. . . . Figure 2.7.1 (B) Nose Gear Height versus Time Prior to Touchdown
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Summary of Significant Events
OTHER
2.8.1 Normal Events
Other normal events observed included: ice and vapor from the ET/Orbiter
umbilical areas during SSME ignition, elevon motion at SSME ignition, RCS
paper debris prior to liftoff, ET twang, multiple pieces of light-colored debris
falling from the LH2 and LO2 TSM T-0 umbilicals at disconnect, acoustic waves
after liftoff, debris in the exhaust cloud after liftoff, vapor off the SRB stiffener
tings, roll maneuver, contrails from the Orbiter wing tips, condensation around the
Shuttle Launch Vehicle, ET aft dome outgassing and charring of the ET aft dome,
linear optical effects, recirculation, SRB brightening prior to SRB separation, SRB
separation, and slag debris during and after SRB separation.
2.8.2 Normal Pad Events
Normal Pad events observed were: Hydrogen ignitor operation, FSS deluge water
operation, MLP deluge water activation, sound suppression system water
operation, TSM T-O umbilical operations, and GH2 vent arm retraction.
I
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APPENDIX B. MSFC PHOTOGRAPHIC ANALYSIS SUMMARY
B

National Aeronautics and
Space Administration
George C. Marshall Space Flight Center
Marshall Space Flight Center, AL 35812
Att_of: EP71 (98-001 ) January 12, 1997
TO" Distribution
FROM" EP73/Thomas J. Rieckhoff
SUBJECT" Engineering Photographic Analysis Report for STS-87
The launch of space shuttle mission STS-87, the 24th flight of the Orbiter Columbia occurred on
November 19, 1997, at approximately 1:46 P.M. Central Standard Time from launch complex
39B (LC-39B), Kennedy Space Center (KSC), Florida. Launch time was reported as
97:323"19:45:59.993 Universal Coordinated Time (UTC) by the MSFC Flight Evaluation Team.
Clouds obscured the vehicle from several of the tracking cameras approximately one minute
after launch reducing the available data from photography. No ground based camera systems
problems were reported. The onboard umbilical well films and the astronaut hand held 70mm
and video data were received at MSFC. All onboard camera systems operated normally and
provided excellent data.
Loss of TPS material was observed on the ET intertank thrust panels on both the +Y and -Y
sides. The first evidence from photography of the TPS loss was after ET separation from the
onboard cameras. Because of the cloud coverage and limited visibility due to moisture in the
atmosphere details of the ET thrust panels were not visible from the grounds based cameras.
Frost was noted around the SSME #2 eyelid at liftoff. The typical observations of debris,
consisting of butcher paper from the RCS motor covers and umbilical baggie material, falling
aft during early ascent were noted.
A piece of the base heat shield thermal blanket around SSME # 1, between the 4 and 5 o'clock
positions, tore and fell from the vehicle. This event was recorded by tracking cameras ET207
and E207. Tearing of the blanket was first noted at 19"46"20.5 UTC. The particle fell from the
vehicle at 19:46"38.52 UTC, creating a debris induced streak in the SSME plume. This
streaking coincides with a plume streak noted from other tracking cameras.
Venting from the GH2 vent was recorded by the astronauts while photographing the ET.
Venting from the GH2 vent has previously been recorded on STS-45. No venting was recorded
on the umbilical well cameras. These cameras view the ET from separation to approximately
200 feet after separation.
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The following event times were acquired.
EVENT
M- 1 PIC Firing
M-2 PIC Firing
M-5 PIC Firing
M-6 PIC Firing
SRB Separation
TIME (UTC)
19:46:00.001
19:46:00.000
19:46:00.001
19:46:00.001
19:48:03.73
DATA SOURCE
Camera E9
Camera E8
Camera E 12
Camera E 13
Camera E212
This report and additional information are available on the World Wide Web at URL:
http://photo4.msfc.nasa.gov/STS/sts87/sts87.html.
For further information concerning this report contact Tom Rieckhoff at 205-544-7677 or Jeff
Hixson, Boeing North Ar_ericari at 205-971-3082.
/
Thomas J. Rieckhoff
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